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This paper examines the role of the social network hierarchy of financial advisory firms
in a mergers and acquisitions (M&As) framework. Financial advisors are information in-
termediaries who play an information extraction and information dissemination role. The
more central the advisory firm is within the network of advisory firms, the greater their
access to information flows. Our findings indicate that more central advisors are asso-
ciated with higher acquirer announcement abnormal returns, higher abnormal combined
returns and higher operating long-run performance for the new entity. Central advisors
also mitigate information asymmetries, resulting in lower premium paid by bidders. In
return, more central advisory firms demand higher advisory fees, engage in higher M&A
activity and are more likely to advise large acquirers and acquisitions of large and public
deals. Our results are robust to endogeneity and self-selection concerns.
Introduction
There is a substantial and growing literature show-
ing that personal and social connections matter
in financial issues, such as corporate value and
operating performance, policies and practices,
corporate governance, investment policies and
acquisition performance. Personal connection is
an effective mechanism that allows for the ex-
change and transmission of ideas, knowledge and
private information. Sanou, Le Roy and Gnyawali
(2016) show that a firm’s centrality in the network
enhances its competitive aggressiveness and its
market performance. Houston, Lee and Suntheim
(2018) show that inter-bank connected firms are
more likely to partner in the syndicated loan mar-
ket. Portfolio managers are more likely to invest in
firms that are socially connected (Cohen, Frazzini
and Malloy, 2008). Other studies investigate the
role of connections among company directors and
executives (Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Hwang and
Kim, 2009; Larcker, So and Wang, 2013), bidder
and target directors (Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Ishii
and Xuan, 2014), bankers and borrowers (Engel-
berg, Gao and Parsons, 2012; Ferreira and Matos,
2012), sell-side analysts (Cohen, Frazzini and
Malloy, 2010) and venture capitalists (Hochberg,
Ljungqvist and Lu, 2007), and the impact on
CEO executive compensation (Engelberg, Gao
and Parsons, 2013; Hwang and Kim, 2009).
Personal ties help to enhance information flow
as well as acquisition and transmission of knowl-
edge, private information and ideas (Bruner, 2004;
Schmidt, 2015; Schonlau and Singh, 2009). Social
connections generate valuable soft information
and, in turn, make it easier for market participants
to communicate information that would other-
wise have been hard to share. More generally,
the increased flow of soft information through
social connections can enhance participants’
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understanding of the wider market and industry
dynamics and better respond to market challenges
and conditions.
The social network literature (Brass, 1984;
Ibarra and Andrews, 1993; Tsai and Ghoshal,
1998) suggests that not every relationship and con-
nection in a network is equal. While personal con-
nections contribute to a more efficient and faster
way of spreading and sharing information, knowl-
edge and the flow of ideas, an actor’s location
in a network can determine the benefits and dis-
advantages they face. The positions of actors in
the network differ significantly, and there is a hi-
erarchy. Bhardwaj, Qureshi and Lee (2008) argue
that the central position of an actor enables her
to have a structural advantage in her network.
El-Khatib, Fogel and Jandik (2015) examine the
role of CEO network centrality in merger and ac-
quisition (M&A) decisions and reveal the impor-
tance of dominant CEOs in their network. Bajo
et al. (2016) study the informational advantage of
higher-centrality underwriters in initial public of-
ferings (IPOs), highlighting their information dis-
semination and information extraction roles.
Mergers and acquisitions are important and
complex corporate finance activities, which have
been highly debated in terms of value creation
(Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006). In this paper,
we investigate the role of financial advisors within
the M&A framework from a different and new an-
gle. We focus on financial advisors’ positions in
their network, and the informational advantages
that stem from occupying a central location in the
network. Themore central the advisor is in the net-
work, the greater their access to information. (Bajo
et al., 2016). One of the main assets of financial
advisors is their connections and the information
flow these connections generate. Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1994) and Bajo et al. (2016) show that
financial advisors are information intermediaries,
with an information extraction and information
dissemination role.
In the M&As market, financial advisors use
their network to extract information about indus-
try dynamics. A central position in the network
enables them to have access to a greater number
of market participants and better knowledge and
understanding of industry dynamics, such as lo-
cal competition and market opportunities; hence,
they are better equipped to identify and select tar-
get firms that could more efficiently leverage the
resources and capabilities of the acquirer. In addi-
tion, through their wider network, they can better
match bidding with target firms, leading to higher
synergistic gains for the newly combined firm. The
identification of appropriate targets, accurate val-
uation and structuring of synergistic deals, and the
provision of advice on strategic actions, are key
M&A-related activities (McLaughlin, 1992) that
involve access to, and production of, information.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) develop a
model that explains the information quality of
underwriters in an initial public offerings context.
They highlight the function of financial intermedi-
aries as information producers who help mitigate
the negative impact of information asymmetry
in financial markets (see also Booth and Smith,
1986; Titman and Trueman, 1986). Financial
advisors have the incentive to build a reputation
as accurate information generators, or credible
certifiers (Bajo et al., 2016; Kale, Kini and Ryan,
2003). Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) further
highlight that their model is applicable in cases
such as M&As, where advisors act as information
producers, helping to reduce the adverse impact
of information asymmetry in financial markets.
One of the direct implications of their model in
an M&A context suggests that the greater the
informational advantage of a financial advisor,
the more effective it is in reducing the impact of
information asymmetry in the equity market.
We argue that being central in a network should
be associated with improved access to flows of
information, thereby raising the chances that the
information produced will reduce information
asymmetry. Central financial advisors can allevi-
ate information asymmetries between the bidder
and the target. Through their wider network, cen-
tral advisors can extract and produce information
related to the target’s assets, contributing to more
accurate target valuations. Then, they can provide
robust advice to the management of the acquirer,
and acquirers could avoid overpayment. The po-
tential value improvements should be larger in
cases where the bidder is subject to heightened
information asymmetry.
We collect a sample of US domesticM&As from
2000 to 2012 and construct four measures of cen-
trality for the respective advisors. Three dimen-
sions of centrality in a social network are proposed
by Freeman (1977, 1979), that is degree (num-
ber of direct connections), closeness (fewer steps
between actors/nodes) and betweenness central-
ity (gatekeeper between other nodes). The fourth
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dimension, introduced by Bonacich (1972), is
eigenvector centrality, which determines how in-
fluential an actor’s position is. To construct the
four centrality measures, we need to establish con-
nections among financial advisors. We employ two
different approaches. First, we use the Boardex
database to determine financial advisors’ peer net-
work, which is defined as the organization’s peer
network on the basis of the social connections of
its top management (CEO, chair, directors of the
board, CFO and executive directors) via prior em-
ployment, education or social activities. Florackis
and Sainani (2018) emphasize the importance of
the CFO’s role, among other key directors, in shap-
ing key corporate policies. Second, for robustness,
we followBajo et al.’s (2016) approach and identify
a connection between two advisors if they have ad-
vised the same bidder in the last 5 years.
Our results show that central financial advisors
manage to create more value for bidders’ share-
holders. We find a positive and significant relation-
ship between advisor centrality and acquirer an-
nouncement abnormal returns for the large group
of non-top-tier advisors. To deal with the endo-
geneity and self-selection bias that arises between
the bidders and advisors’ selection process, driven
by observable and unobservable firm and deal
characteristics, we employ a Heckman two-stage
procedure process and a propensity scorematching
methodology. Higher-centrality advisors are more
likely to be involved with larger bidders, to advise
larger deals and to be involved in acquisitions of
public target firms. The matching between bidders
and advisorsmay not be a randomprocess, and the
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator may be bi-
ased. We compare high- versus low-centrality ad-
visors based on observable characteristics. The re-
sults remain robust and continue to hold even after
these controls. We further show that central advi-
sors are positively correlatedwith higher combined
announcement returns for the new entity, as well as
superior long-run performance.
By utilizing their leading position in their net-
works, central advisors seem to benefit their clients.
Following Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1994)
model of information asymmetry, we argue that
advisors can alleviate asymmetries and we ex-
amine the impact of centrality on deal premi-
ums. Our findings suggest that central advisors
help alleviate information asymmetries between
bidders and targets and advise for more optimal
valuations.
In addition, we examine whether financial ad-
visors benefit from being involved in M&A trans-
actions. Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) claim that
M&A advisory fees are a major source of rev-
enue for investment banks. Golubov, Petmezas and
Travlos (2012) report that over 85% of M&A deals
by transaction value around the world were ad-
vised by investment banks in 1997 alone, and these
advisors generated $39.7 billion in income from
their advisory services. Our results show that there
is a positive and significant relationship between
bidders’ advisor centrality and the fees they charge.
These findings imply that central advisors not only
create value for their clients, but also charge higher
advisory fees for their services. Furthermore, our
findings show that central financial advisors are in-
volved inmoreM&Aactivity than disconnected or
less central advisors, and are more likely to advise
large acquirers, acquisitions of public targets firms
and acquisitions involving relatively larger targets.
Overall, the results are robust when we employ
an additional proxy to capture the connections be-
tween advisors based on their prior working re-
lationships, as in Bajo et al. (2016). The results
are robust for alternative windows of bidders’ cu-
mulative abnormal returns (CARs). For robust-
ness, we orthogonalize the centrality measures by
three variables, namely reputation, past perfor-
mance and prior relationship, and re-run the anal-
ysis with the orthogonal version of the central-
ity measures (Nyborg and Ostberg, 2014). We find
similar results for the centrality coefficients.
This paper makes several contributions to the
existing literature. It is the first paper to exam-
ine the impact of financial advisor centrality in
an M&A framework. Our findings suggest that
the position of a financial advisor in their net-
work has a significant effect on various issues re-
lated to M&As, such as deal outcome and advi-
sory fees. Our paper closely relates to El-Khatib,
Fogel and Jandik (2015), who examine the im-
pact of CEO centrality on M&As. El-Khatib, Fo-
gel and Jandik (2015) show that central CEOs are
more likely to undertake value-destroying acquisi-
tions because they are self-motivated and use their
power to increase entrenchment. Our paper also
shows that centrality matters in a financial advisor
setting. This study also relates to Bajo et al. (2016),
who discuss the role of underwriter centrality in an
IPO framework.
Second, we extend the literature that exam-
ines financial advisors’ characteristics and their
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impact on takeover deals. The existing litera-
ture suggests numerous non-economic factors for
the bidder’s choice of financial advisor, like the
advisor’s performance (Sibilkov and McConnell,
2014), scope (Song,Wei andZhou, 2013) and repu-
tation (Derrien andDessaint, 2018; Kale, Kini and
Ryan, 2003; Rau, 2000); the prior relation of bid-
ders with their advisory banks (Francis, Hasan and
Sun, 2014); and the advisor’s industry-specific ex-
pertise (Chang et al., 2016; Wang, Xie and Zhang,
2014). This study claims that financial advisor cen-
trality is a key determinant that significantly af-
fects the choice of financial advisors during the ac-
quisition process.
Third, our study further highlights the infor-
mational role of financial advisors in the corpo-
rate world and in financial markets. It builds and
extends the theoretical implications of Chemma-
nur and Fulghieri’s (1994) model, which assumes
that underwriters have equal access to information
channels, and their deviations in reputation helps
to certify the quality of information. This paper
utilizes measures that capture the informational
position of financial advisors and their implica-
tions forM&A outcomes. Our study also relates to
Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), who show
that top-tier advisors are able to deliver higher bid-
der returns. Our paper shows that one of the un-
derlying mechanisms that is crudely captured by
splitting advisors into top- and non-top-tier is the
informational advantage stemming from a more
central position in the network.
The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows. The next section discusses the economic
mechanism along with relevant literature and
builds the hypotheses. The third section describes
the sample construction and centrality measures.
The fourth section explores the informational role
of advisors; while the fifth section presents extra
test and robustness checks and the sixth section
concludes.
Related literature, economic mechanism
and hypothesis development
This section discusses related literature and the
mechanism of how the central position of a
financial advisor in their network can affect the
outcomes of M&As. The theoretical framework on
which we develop the mechanism through which
central financial advisors affect M&A outcomes
draws from two strands of literature. One strand
argues that financial advisors serve as financial in-
termediaries and perform a number of tasks. One
of the major functions of financial advisors is the
extraction, production and dissemination of in-
formation (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Gol-
ubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012). This strand of
the literature focuses on top-tier financial advisors
and claims that top-tier banks provide a certifica-
tion mechanism to the market about the potential
synergies emanating from M&As. Golubov, Pet-
mezas and Travlos (2012) claim that top-tier ad-
visors generate synergies for bidder shareholders
due to reputation effects and higher-quality skills.
This paper proposes a different and new angle
for financial advisors involved in M&As. Moti-
vated by another strand of the literature on social
connections, we propose that financial advisors’
connections and their central position in their
network can affect M&A outcomes. Studies on
social connections show that personal ties help to
enhance information flow as well as acquisition
and transmission of knowledge, private infor-
mation and ideas (Bruner, 2004; Schmidt, 2015;
Schonlau and Singh, 2009). For example, Bekkers,
Verspagen and Smits (2002) find that central firms
in an industrial network are positively associated
with market share and intellectual property rights
because they readily acquire knowledge about the
latest important technologies and market envi-
ronment. Larcker, So and Wang (2013) show that
firms with centralized boards experience better
performance in terms of operating profit and risk-
adjusted stock return. They identify the economic
benefits of directors’ centrality as one reason
for firms’ positive performance; well-connected
directors have prior knowledge of industry trends,
market conditions and regulatory changes. De-
spite the growing literature on social connections,
there is limited evidence on the role of financial
advisors’ networking hierarchy in M&A outcomes
and characteristics.
The information and knowledge that central
financial advisors acquire through their networks
can affect M&A outcomes via two channels. First,
more central financial advisors are better posi-
tioned to extract information from their network
about market and industry-wide dynamics, and
to propose appropriate target firms that can cre-
ate synergic gains for the bidders’ shareholders.
Central financial advisors are expected to have a
wealth of knowledge and better understanding of
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market and industry dynamics due to their greater
connectivity, which provides valuable information
about market conditions, industry trends, firm
insider information and critical legal and regu-
lation changes (Ahuja, 2000; Berg, Duncan and
Friedman, 1982). This comparative information
advantage would make it easier for financial advi-
sors to identify wealth-creating takeover options
for bidders and reduce transaction costs. Yawson
and Zhang (2017) suggest that central network
positions convey an information advantage and
can help financial advisors achieve better M&A
outcomes and alleviate information asymmetries.
The theoretical building blocks are derived from
Benveniste and Spindt (1989). They argue that in-
vestment banks have the ability to extract private
information from institutional investors and ex-
ploit this information to more accurately value
IPOs. Bruner (2004) shows that board networks
provide information about potential target firms,
which leads to more efficient identification of ac-
tual targets and thus reduces potentially large
search costs, while social linkage reduces the
cost of gathering information, which translates to
value-creating merger deals.
The second channel relates to the attention at-
traction and dissemination of information propo-
sitions (Bajo et al., 2016). The network centrality
of a financial advisor can also affect their ability
to attract attention and disseminate information to
various market participants about the quality of
the deal, both in terms of synergy gains and firm
valuation. The theoretical predictions lie in the
model of Merton (1987) and the ‘investor recog-
nition’ or ‘attention’ model. Merton (1987) argues
that information is useful to the financial market
not only when it is revealed but, most importantly,
when attention is paid to it. Information attention
and acquisition come with a cost. Financial advi-
sors, through their central position in the network,
can have significant implications for information
dissemination and investor attention with regard
to the quality of the deal. Through the investment
banks in their network, a central financial advisor
will be more connected to a greater number of in-
stitutions, allowing them tomore efficiently convey
information about the quality of the deal, poten-
tial synergistic gains and risks of overpayment.
Conclusively, a central position in a network en-
ables advisors to have access to a greater number of
market participants, and greater depth of knowl-
edge of market and industry dynamics. Hence,
they are better equipped to identify and select tar-
get firms that could more efficiently leverage the
resources and capabilities of the acquirer. Their
wider network can also help to extract and pro-
duce information related to the target’s assets, con-
tributing tomore accurate target valuations. In this
way, they can provide robust advice to the man-
agement of the acquirer, and acquirers could avoid
overpayment. Central financial advisors could also
bid for M&A deals on favourable terms for their
clients due to their better negotiation and bargain-
ing position. The above leads us to the following
hypothesis:
H1a: There is a positive relation between bidders’
announcement abnormal returns and bidders’ fi-
nancial advisors’ centrality measures.
Similarly, if central advisors are better able to
more effectively match bidding with target firms,
that would benefit both parties involved. More
central financial advisors, who are better posi-
tioned to extract information from their network
about market and industry-wide dynamics, are
better able to match target firms with bidders in
order to generate higher synergy gains. Higher
synergy gains would be beneficial for the share-
holders of both firms, leading to superior long-run
performance as well. Gelles (2014) suggests that
network actors use their personal contacts to
identify potential targets, conduct due diligence,
negotiate and close contracts on favourable terms.
The above leads us to the following hypothesis:
H1b: There is a positive relation between the per-
formance of the newly combined entity and fi-
nancial advisors’ centrality measures.
The information dissemination channel as dis-
cussed above has further implications regard-
ing the reduction of information asymmetries.
Schoorman, Bazerman and Atkin (1981) suggest
that centrality helps to leverage social relationships
by reducing information asymmetry when design-
ing contracts. Characteristics such as information
advantage, power and control should also con-
tribute to value creation for acquiring firms’ share-
holders. A central position in the network helps in
information extraction (Bajo et al., 2016), which is
considered vital for the successful completion of
merger transactions. Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s
(1994) model highlights the implications of advi-
sors’ informational role in mitigating information
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asymmetries in cases such as M&As. We argue
that being central in a network should be associ-
ated with improved access to flows of information,
thereby raising the chances that the information
produced will reduce information asymmetry and
result in value creation and avoid overpayment.
Empirical studies show that targets subject to
higher information asymmetry receive higher pre-
miums (Cheng, Li and Tong, 2016; Zhu and Jog,
2009). In general, equity with information asym-
metry usually sells at lower prices (Hertzel and
Smith, 1993). Cheng, Li and Tong (2016) hypoth-
esize and empirically confirm that bid premium
can appear to increase with the target’s informa-
tion asymmetry. However, Dionne, La Haye and
Bergerès (2015), who also test the impact of infor-
mation asymmetry on acquisition premiums, show
that informed bidders pay lower premiums. They
suggest that participants who do not hold private
information are afraid of suffering from the win-
ner’s curse and either withdraw from the auction
early or do not participate. Betton, Eckbo and
Thorburn (2009) confirm that the size of a toe-
hold has a negative effect both on the final offer
premium and the initial offer price.
Central financial advisors can also help reduce
information asymmetries between bidder and
targets. High information asymmetry between the
two parties can prove challenging for bidding firms
in understating and correctly pricing target firms.
Through their wider network, central advisors
can extract and produce information related to
the target’s assets, contributing to more accurate
target valuations. Following Dionne, La Haye and
Bergerès (2015) and Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn
(2009), we argue that bidders with more central
advisors who are more informed would pay lower
premiums. Central advisors can provide robust
advice to the management of the acquirer, and
acquirers could avoid overpayment. Given the
impact of information asymmetry on acquisition
premiums, the phenomenon would be even more
pronounced for targets subject to high infor-
mation asymmetry. Central advisors can prove
particularly useful when information asymmetry
between the bidder and the target firm is high.
Hence, we obtain the following hypothesis:
H2: Financial advisor centrality is negatively re-
lated to bidders’ premiums and is expected to be
more pronounced for targets subject to higher in-
formation asymmetry.
M&A sample and network centrality
data
M&A sample
A sample of USmergers and acquisitions is down-
loaded from the Securities Data Company (SDC)
Mergers and Acquisitions database over the pe-
riod 2000–2012. We include all domestic merger
deals announced by public acquirers. The sample
is further screened. We exclude (i) all deals charac-
terized as leveraged buyout, exchange offer, repur-
chase, spin-off, recapitalization, privatization and
self-tender; (ii) mergers in the utilities and finan-
cials industries; (iii) transactionswith no deal value
disclosed by SDC; (iv) all M&A deals with a value
of either less than onemillionUSDor less than 1%
of the acquirer market value; (v) deals in which the
percentage of share acquired by the bidder is less
than 50% of the target’s share; and (vi) deals for
which neither the target’s nor the bidder’s advisor
information is available in SDC.
After these exclusions, our final sample consists
of 2,250 acquisition deals. The financial informa-
tion of the final M&A sample is downloaded from
DataStream. Table 1 presents further information
related to the distribution of the sample over time
(Panel A) and across industries (Panel B).
Financial advisors’ connections
We use the SDC to download data on financial
advisors involved in US domestic takeovers either
as the bidder’s or the target’s advisor over the pe-
riod January 2000 to December 2012. As the SDC
sometimes provides multiple codes for the same
bank or mentions the same advisor’s name in dif-
ferent styles, we manually check advisors’ codes
and names to avoid repetition. In the case of mul-
tiple advisors being involved in a deal, we keep the
financial advisor with the highest centrality. The fi-
nal sample has 627 unique advisor names. Boardex
provides connections information data from 2000
onwards. This is why the M&A sample starts in
2000.
We use the Boardex database to determine
financial advisors’ peer network, which is defined
as the organization’s peer network on the basis
of individuals’ social connections. We manually
collect data with regard to the social connections
of advisors’ directors. Directors refer to the CEO,
the chair or president, directors of the board, the
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the sample
Panel A: By year Panel B: By acquirer industry
Year Number % Industries Number %
2000 241 10.71% Basic Materials 71 3.16%
2001 211 9.38% Consumer Goods 186 8.27%
2002 181 8.04% Consumer Services 276 12.27%
2003 170 7.56% Healthcare 367 16.31%
2004 188 8.36% Industrials 441 19.60%
2005 210 9.33% Oil & Gas 206 9.16%
2006 193 8.58% Technology 620 27.56%






Total 2,250 100% Total 2,250 100%
Statistics on variables N Mean Std dev.
Panel C: Bidding firm characteristics
Bidder size 2,250 7.030 1.927
Market to book 2,250 4.285 27.784
Free cash flow 2,250 0.104 0.349
Return on assets 2,250 0.147 0.195
Leverage 2,250 27.799 24.654
CARs (−1, +1) 2,250 0.011 0.120
Panel D: Deal characteristics
Relative deal size 2,250 0.478 1.812
Public 2,250 0.331 0.470
Private 2,250 0.370 0.483
Cash deals 2,250 0.341 0.474
Stock deals 2,250 0.155 0.362
Diversifying deals 2,250 0.374 0.484
Panel E: Bidder advisor characteristics
Prior relation 2,250 0.115 0.319
Past performance 2,250 0.007 0.049
Advisor reputation 2,250 8.14 13.637
This table presents the descriptive statistics for 2,250 domestic M&A deals announced by US acquiring firms from 2000 to 2012. The
value of each deal is at least $1 million, and more than 50% share is acquired in the transaction. Definitions of all variables are given in
the Appendix. Panel A presents sample statistics by year, Panel B by acquirer’s industry and Panels C–E provide statistics on a number
of variables employed in empirical analysis.
CFO and executive directors. Related studies dis-
cuss important CEO features, such as extraversion
(Malhotra et al., 2018) and experience in the tar-
get’s industry (Fitch and Nguyen, 2020) in M&A
acquisitiveness. Individuals remain connected with
their old organization when they join another firm
or retire. For example, two companies may share
a board member or individual working for both
companies, who also works as an independent
director of a non-professional organization (club,
charity, etc.). Hence, the organizational network
keeps multiplying and becoming stronger with the
increase of its individual connections. Boardex
provides information for 511 of the 627 financial
advisors in our sample.
Point to point matching is performed among fi-
nancial advisors to determine the financial advi-
sor peer network. Financial advisors exhibit first-
degree connections when they are connected with
their peers through an individual’s overlapping; for
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example, when one individual is an independent di-
rector of two advisory firms. Financial advisors are
connected with their peers through second-degree
connections when individuals are linked through a
third party, for example individuals belonging to
two separate financial advisory firms who went to
the same educational institution, worked together
in a professional institution, were members or offi-
cers in a charity organization or spend their leisure
time together in a club. To make our proxy more
meaningful, we consider only the first-degree con-
nections of individuals. We collect data on indi-
viduals who hold roles which could have a signifi-
cant impact on a firm’smerger decision, such as the
CEO, chair, directors of the board, CFO and ex-
ecutive directors. Financial advisors’ peer connec-
tions are also measured on a 5-year trailing basis
by considering the time bias issue. We construct an
N×Nmatrix of financial advisors for each sample
year. Each cell in the matrix takes a value of one if
top executives (CEO, chair, directors of the board,
CFO and executive directors) of two financial ad-
visory firms have been connected through a first-
degree connection at some point over the 5-year
period. Financial advisor centrality is estimated on
a yearly basis and, finally, we obtain yearly central-
ity measures for 209 advisors.
Financial advisor centrality measures
Centrality is a multi-dimensional concept. We use
four dimensions to measure financial advisors’
centrality in their peer networks. Three dimensions
of centrality in a social network are proposed by
Freeman (1977, 1979): degree (number of direct
connections), closeness (fewer steps between ac-
tors/nodes) and betweenness (acting as gatekeep-
ers between other nodes). The fourth dimension
is eigenvector centrality, introduced by Bonancich
(1972), which determines the influential position
of an actor.
Degree centrality indicates the number of di-
rect connections that a financial advisor has in his
peer network.Closeness centrality counts the num-
ber of steps between two financial advisors. Sim-
ilar to degree centrality, it measures the strength
of connections but considers both direct and in-
direct connections. Betweenness centrality deter-
mines the extent to which a financial advisor is
a link between two other advisors. The underly-
ing concept is how well situated a financial advi-
sor is, in terms of the network paths he has. The
influential position of financial advisors is also de-
termined through eigenvector centrality. Ties with
higher-status actors (well-connected actors) in a
network help to elevate one’s own status, whereas
ties to lower-status actors can compromise it
(Podolny, 1993). Eigenvector centrality determines
the well-connectedness of an agent through the
well-connectedness of his direct links. A detailed
description of the measures can be found in the
Appendix (see online supporting information).
The correlation among the four measures of
centrality is relatively high, ranging from 0.78 (cor-
relation between closeness and degree) to 0.95
(correlation between degree and betweenness).
The four centrality measures tend to capture dif-
ferent aspects of the centrality of actors in the
network.
Financial advisor reputation measure
The financial advisor league table for the year 2012
is downloaded from Thomson Financial SDC. We
rank the top 10 financial advisors according to the
value of deals advised as top-tier, and the remain-
ing advisors as non-top-tier. For the value of deals
advised, as a cut-off point, we use $100,000 mil-
lion. For the percentage of market share, the cut-
off point is 10%. In other words, financial advi-
sors for which the value of deals advised is above
$100,000 million, or their market share is above
10%, are classified as top-tier. The ranking of the
top 10 financial advisors is also determined based
on the fact that these banks are almost always in
the top 10 in advisor league. The list of top-tier
advisors in Table 2 contains some of the largest
and most globally orientated and systematically
important banks that perform a range of key tasks
for the financial system, apart from acting as ad-
visors in M&A deals.1 Hence, they are quantita-
tively and qualitatively different from other insti-
tutions. Based on this, and the fact that the previ-
ous M&A-related literature has mainly focused on
the role of top-tier advisors (e.g. Chemmanur and
Fulghieri, 1994; Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos,
1For example, they act as market-makers in sovereign
bond markets in the USA and abroad, and participate in
the implementation of monetary policy as trading coun-
terparties of the central bank; 8 of the 10 top-tier in-
stitutions mentioned above are currently in the list of
the Primary Dealers of the New York Fed (https://www.
newyorkfed.org/markets/primarydealers).
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
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Table 3. Top-tier dummy for acquirer financial advisor and acquirer short-run performance
All Public Private Subsidiary
CARs (−1, +1) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Top-tier dummy 0.021*** 0.034** 0.016 0.015
Public −0.032***
Stock −0.017* −0.024*** 0.021 0.027
Bidder size −0.006*** −0.004 −0.002 −0.013***
MTBV −0.0003 0.0002 −0.002 −0.0004**
RS 0.001 −0.005 0.023*** 0.0007
Diversification −0.007 −0.009 −0.016** 0.003
Free cash flow 0.002 0.007*** 0.116*** 0.015
ROA −0.028 −0.069 −0.167** 0.013
Leverage 0.0003** 0.002** 0.0002 0.0002
Tender offer −0.003 −0.029
Hostile takeover 0.028 0.025
Prior relation −0.006 0.004 −0.009 0.003
Past performance 0.048 0.041 0.016 0.194
Advisor reputation −0.003* −0.004* −0.002 −0.002
Constant 0.049*** 0.007 0.030 0.108
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2050 715 711 624
Pseudo R-squared 0.079 0.097 0.102 0.089
*, ** and *** depict the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
This table presents the regression results for the top-tier financial advisors on bidders’ announcement abnormal returns for a sample of
US acquisitions announced over the period 2000–2012. The top-tier dummy takes the value of one if the acquisition deal involves an
advisor who belongs to the top-tier financial advisor group, and zero otherwise. Bidders’ short-run returns are calculated as the CARs
over the window (−1, +1) around the acquisition announcement. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted
model. The dependent variable in all regressions is acquirer CARs. We control for deal, firm and financial advisor characteristics.
Definitions of the variables are given in the Appendix.
2012), we are motivated to divide the sample into
top-tier and non-top-tier advisors and consider the
implications of centrality for both groups. Table 2
presents the average value of deals advised by top-
tier advisors; their average market share is around
6.5 times higher than the average deal value ad-
vised and the market share of non-top-tier advi-
sors. Top-tier advisors are the most central in the
sample. The average degree centrality of top-tier
advisors is four times more than the average de-
gree centrality of non-top-tier advisors. The other
centrality measures in our sample also show simi-
lar trends.
To test the robustness of our sample against
prior literature, we also test the association be-
tween top-tier advisor and bidders’ abnormal
returns. Table 3 presents the regression results for
the whole sample as well as for different types
of M&A deals based on targets’ public status.
Bidders’ returns are calculated as the CARs over
the 3-day window (−1, +1) around the acquisition
announcement. The main independent variable in
all regressions is a top-tier dummy variable, which
takes the value of one if the deal is advised by a
top-tier financial advisor, and zero otherwise. The
results show that top-tier advisors create value in
public acquisitions while failing to create share-
holder wealth in private and subsidiary M&A
deals. The result is consistent with the findings
of Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), which
strengthens the validity of our sample with earlier
studies.
Empirical analysis: The informational
role of central financial advisors
Financial advisor centrality and acquisition quality
In this section, we investigate whether leading
advisors can help acquirers to identify value-
creating deals and the wealth effects on bidders’
and targets’ shareholders. First, we examine the
impact of central financial advisors on bidders’ an-
nouncement abnormal returns. Following Fuller,
Netter and Stegemoller (2002), we use event study
methodology to calculate CARs, which are the
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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summation of abnormal returns for the 3 days
surrounding the announcement date (−1, +1).
Table 4 presents the regression analysis results,
where the dependent variable is acquirers’ CARs
for the 3 days surrounding the announcement
date, and the main variables of interest are the
four centrality measures – degree, closeness, be-
tweenness and eigenvector. In addition to industry
and year fixed effects, we also control for a number
of variables that have been shown in the literature
to affect bidder performance.2 Robust standard
errors are clustered by acquiring firm due to the
presence of multiple acquirers in the sample. A
more detailed description of the control variables
is available in the Appendix.
Panel A of Table 4 shows the results for non-
top-tier advisors. The centrality coefficients are all
positive and statistically significant. The regression
analysis shows a positive relationship between ad-
visor centrality and the market reaction around
the acquisition announcement date. The first re-
gression suggests that more central advisors man-
age to identify value-enhancing deals for bidding
firms and create value for their clients. Panel B of
Table 4 depicts the results for top-tier financial ad-
visors. The centrality coefficients are all statisti-
cally insignificant. The results seem to suggest that
there are diminishing returns from centrality as fi-
nancial advisors grow extremely large and central.
The focus of this paper from this point onwards is
non-top-tier financial advisors.
The analysis is based on the assumption that the
choice between high-centrality and low-centrality
advisors is exogenously determined. The involve-
ment of a high- or low-centrality advisor is a
matter of choice made by the bidder and the
advisor, which could lead to self-selection bias,
resulting in unreliable OLS estimates. To control
for self-selection bias, we apply a Heckman (1979)
two-step procedure where the first-stage equation
models the choice between a high-centrality and a
low-centrality advisor, and the second-stage equa-
tion corrects for the selection bias. Following Kai
and Prabhala (2007) and Golubov, Petmezas and
Travlos (2012), we introduce the variable ‘prior
relationship’ as an identification restriction in
the first-stage equation. The relationship variable
takes the value of one if the firms retain the same
2For a subsample of the initial sample, we also control for
CEO degree centrality and the results remain robust.
advisors from their previous M&A transactions
over the sample period, and zero otherwise.
The results of the Heckman two-step procedure
are presented in Table 5. In the first step, the coef-
ficient of the prior relationship variable is statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level, which shows that
the extent to which a bidder used the services of
a high-centrality advisor bank in the past is pos-
itively related to the decision to employ a highly
central advisor again. The inverse Mills ratio from
the first equation is used as a regressor in the
second-stage model. The coefficient of the inverse
Mills ratio is positive and statistically significant,
which reflects self-selection. Certain observed and
unobserved characteristics that increase the proba-
bility of choosing a central advisor further increase
bidder CAR.
To further address the pure effect of advisor cen-
trality on bidder CARs, a propensity score match-
ing process is applied. Our results also indicate that
leading financial advisors are more likely to be as-
sociated with large acquirers. One could argue that
our results may be driven by this selection bias is-
sue. Firm and deal characteristics like bidder size,
target public status, market-to-book value, relative
deal size, method of payment, free cash flow and
leverage may drive the acquirer short-run perfor-
mance results.
Although we control for bidder and deal char-
acteristics in the regression analysis in Table 4, for
robustness reasons and to further address this se-
lection bias issue, we employ a propensity score
nearest-neighbour matching without replacement
methodology (nn-1). Following Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1985), we apply a caliper of 0.25 standard
deviations to reduce at least 90% of bias. Acquir-
ers advised by more centrally located advisors are
matched with acquirers advised by low-centrality
advisors on the basis of firm and deal character-
istics. In this way, the two subsamples consist of
acquisitions of bidders with similar firm and deal
characteristics; therefore, these variables are un-
likely to drive the abnormal returns results. Panel
A of Table 6 presents the regression analysis af-
ter propensity score matching on firm and deal
characteristics is applied. The coefficients for the
four centrality measures remain positive and sta-
tistically significant.
We further employ the propensity score match-
ing approach and we now match on advisors’
characteristics, such as reputation, past perfor-
mance, prior relation, type of advisor and industry
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
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Table 7. Acquirer financial advisor centrality and acquirer abnormal return on assets
Degree Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector





Public 0.185 0.214 0.189 0.179
Stock −0.166 −0.182 −0.164 −0.163
Bidder size 0.196** 0.223** 0.196** 0.193**
MTBV 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
RS 0.015 0.019 0.016 0.015
Diversification 0.627 0.624 0.625 0.628
Free cash flow 1.775*** 1.726*** 1.775*** 1.784***
Leverage −0.001** −0.001** −0.001** −0.001**
Tender offer 1.485 1.456 1.487 1.491
Prior relation 0.009 0.073 0.009 0.097
Past performance 1.252 1.501 1.307 1.119
Advisor reputation 0.001** 0.078** 0.001** 0.001**
Constant 1.818** 1.347** 1.831** 1.847**
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1319 1319 1319 1319
R-squared 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106
*, ** and *** depict the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
This table presents the regression results for the centrality measures of non-top-tier bidder financial advisors on bidders’ long-term
accounting performance. The dependent variable in all regressions is abnormal ROA. Abnormal ROA is calculated as the ROA of the
firm after 3 years of M&A transaction less the value-weighted average ROA of the acquirer and target firms 12 months before the
deal announcement. The main independent variables are the four centrality measures. We control for deal, firm and financial advisor
characteristics. Definitions of the control variables are given in the Appendix.
expertise.3 Panel B of Table 6 presents the re-
gression analysis results. The centrality coefficients
for all four measures are positive and statisti-
cally significant. In unreported results, we further
match on different combinations of firm- and deal-
specific characteristics and the results remain ro-
bust. Our results are also robust to other event win-
dows, such as (−2, +2). These findings indicate
that central financial advisors succeed in identify-
ing synergy-enhancing acquisitions for their clients
and create wealth for bidders’ shareholders.
If central advisors are better able to more ef-
fectively match bidding with target firms, that
would benefit both parties involved. More central
financial advisors who are better positioned to
extract information from their network about
market- and industry-wide dynamics are better
able to match target firms with bidders in order
to generate higher synergy gains. To empirically
examine H1b, we adopt two metrices. To further
access and establish the quality of the deal and the
combined benefits to bidders and targets, we use
a long-term performance measure, such as abnor-
mal return on assets (ROA). Abnormal ROA is
estimated, as is the average ROA of the acquirer in
the 3-year period after deal completion, minus the
value-weighted average ROA of the acquirer and
target in the year prior to the deal announcement
(Li, Qui and Shen, 2017). Table 7 presents the
regression analysis results, where the dependent
variable is abnormal ROA and the main variables
of interest are the four centrality measures. As
control variables, we employ the same variables as
in Table 4. The results show a positive and statis-
tically significant relationship between abnormal
ROA and the centrality measures, indicating that
the better match between bidders and targets leads
to superior long-run performance.
3Following Song et al. (2013), the ‘type of advisor’ vari-
able takes the value of one if the advisor involved in the
M&A deal is full service, and zero if it is boutique advi-
sor. In line with Wang et al. (2014), ‘industry expertise’ is
defined as the number of mergers advised by a bank for a
firm’s four-digit SIC industry divided by the total number
of mergers in the industry over the sample period (2000–
2012).
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 8. Combined cumulative abnormal returns and acquirers’ financial advisors’ centrality
Degree Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector





Public −0.032*** ’−0.032*** −0.032*** −0.032***
Stock −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
Bidder size −0.009** −−0.009** −0.008** −0.009**
MTBV −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0003
RS −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001***
Diversification 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005
Return on assets −0.026 −0.0267 −0.025 −0.027
Leverage 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0003
Hostile takeover 0.009 0.006 0.01 0.013
Tender offer −0.002 −0.006 −0.003 −0.003
Bidder past relation 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
Bidder’s advisor past performance −0.152 −0.115 −0.139 −0.175
Bidder’s advisor reputation −0.004** −0.003** −0.004** −0.003*
Target size 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018***
Target advisor’s past performance 0.335 0.323 0.335 0.338
Target financial advisor’s reputation 0.014* 0.013* 0.014* 0.014*
Constant −0.034 −0.111 −0.111 −0.027
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 535 535 535 535
R-squared 0.325 0.312 0.324 0.323
*, ** and *** depict the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
This table presents the regression results for the centrality measures of non-top-tier bidder financial advisors and synergistic gains for
the new combined entity. The dependent variable in all regressions is combined CARs of newly combined firms. Combined CARs are
estimated as the market value-weighted average of the CARs of the bidder and the target around the announcement date. The main
independent variables are the four centrality measures. We control for deal, firm and financial advisor characteristics. Definitions of
the control variables are given in the Appendix.
Furthermore, to assess synergy gains between
bidders and targets, we employ combined cu-
mulative abnormal returns. Following Golubov,
Petmezas and Travlos (2012), combined CARs are
estimated as the market value-weighted average of
the CARs of the bidder and the target around the
announcement date. Combined CARs are used as
ameasure of synergy gains in the corporate finance
literature.
Combined CARs are regressed on bidders’
advisors’ centrality. Table 8 depicts the results. The
findings show a positive and statistically significant
relationship, indicating that more central financial
advisors are indeed able to create synergistic gains
for the new combined entity, benefitting the share-
holders of both the acquirer and the target firm.
Conclusively, more central financial advisors are
able to better match bidding with target firms and
create synergistic gains, which translate to higher
abnormal returns for the bidders’ shareholders and
overall, long-run performance of the combined
entity.
The informational role of financial advisors on
acquirers’ and targets’ information asymmetry
Chemmanur andFulghieri’s (1994)model suggests
that intermediaries act as information producers,
helping to reduce the adverse impact of informa-
tion asymmetry in the financial market. The in-
formation dissemination role of central advisors is
important in conveying information about the deal
(Bajo et al., 2016). In a structurally embedded rela-
tionship, the central status of an actor can control
the flow of information (Tsai, 2001). Central finan-
cial advisors can use their social network to trans-
mit information about proposed merger deals.
The dissemination of information would reduce
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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information asymmetries. This could provide ac-
quirers with another reason to work with more
central advisors when information asymmetry for
target firms is high.
We examine the impact of central financial advi-
sors and how they can alleviate information asym-
metry between bidding and target firms. Through
their wider network, central advisors can extract
and produce information related to the target’s as-
sets, contributing to more accurate target valua-
tions. Prior literature (Cheng, Li and Tong, 2016;
Zhu and Jog, 2009) shows that there is a positive re-
lationship between premiums paid to target firms
and information asymmetry. However, informed
bidders pay a lower premium and this is more pro-
nounced in a high information asymmetry setting
(Dionne, La Haye and Bergerès, 2015).
We conduct OLS regression to investigate the
association between financial advisor centrality
and acquisitions’ premium by using eight mea-
sures of information asymmetry for bidders and
targets. Namely, these are: diversifying deals,
target firm segmentation, target industry risk,
target firms’ age, target size, relative deal size,
asset turnover and target return volatility. Ser-
vaes and Zenner (1996) argue that information
asymmetry increases when the acquirer and target
firms operate in different industries. We create
a diversification dummy variable that takes the
value of one if the acquirer and target firm op-
erate in different industries, and zero otherwise.
Similarly, target firms with a large number of
business segments are difficult to evaluate due
to their diverse structure and large size, creating
information asymmetry between acquiring and
target firms. We calculate the number of business
segments for each target firm. A dummy variable
takes the value of one if the number of segments
for the target firm is higher than the mean number
of segments, and zero otherwise. High return
volatility reflects high risk, which may induce
information asymmetry for investors (Corwin,
2003). To capture this information asymmetry
effect between acquirers and targets, we create
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if
the industry return volatility of a target firm is
above the median, and zero otherwise. Older and
larger firms tend to disclose higher amounts of
information (Black et al., 2017; Frankel and Li,
2004), so the discrepancies between insiders’ and
outsiders’ information are low. Age is calculated as
the difference between the date of incorporation
of the firm and the date of merger announcement
(Karpoff, Lee andMasulis, 2013).Wemeasure size
as the natural log of the book value of total assets
in the year prior to merger announcement (Officer,
Ozbas and Sensoy, 2010). Similarly, relatively large
M&A deals and firms with high asset turnover
tend to be relatively easy to value, as investors
generally have good information about big deals
and profitable target firms (Dionne, La Haye and
Bergerès, 2015). Relative deal size, taken from the
SDC, is the value of the deal as reported by the
SDC over the market value of the acquirer. Asset
turnover is the ratio between net sales and average
total assets. Volatility is calculated as the standard
deviation of daily stock returns (or abnormal
returns) over the last 200 days, which is −206 to
−6 before the merger announcement. High stock
return volatility depicts a noisy information envi-
ronment (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006), which
leads to information asymmetry between firm and
investors (Karpoff, Lee and Masulis, 2013).
Table 9 presents the regression analysis results
for the degree centrality measure and the premi-
ums bidders pay when they face high- versus low-
asymmetry firms. Regressions (1)–(8) show the re-
sults for the eight information symmetry proxies,
respectively. The main variable of interest is the
interaction variable between centrality and infor-
mation asymmetry. The coefficients in all cases
are negative and statistically significant, indicat-
ing that when information asymmetry for target
firms is high, bidders who employ more central ad-
visors pay a lower premium. The results are robust
for all four centrality measures. Central advisors
help reduce information asymmetries between bid-
ders and targets, leading to more accurate valu-
ations and avoidance of overpayment. This find-
ing is consistent with Dionne, La Haye and Berg-
erès (2015) and Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn
(2009), who show that informed bidders pay lower
premiums.
Extra tests and robustness checks
In this section, we discuss whether central financial
advisors are paid more for their superior services
and whether they can enhance their revenues
by getting involved in takeover activity. We also
present various robustness tests.
Financial advisors are well paid due to their
superior expertise and skilful negotiation (Walter,
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
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Yawson and Yeung, 2008). First- and second-tier
advisors charge substantially higher advisory
fees. Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) find
that top-tier banks charge a premium advisory
fee, which motivates them to build up and main-
tain their reputational capital. In turn, advisors
provide high-quality services to their clients. Man-
agers occupying central network positions are
expected to be higher in a social hierarchy and
should be considered more influential and pow-
erful (Mizruchi and Potts, 1998). Based on this
fact, central financial advisors could demand high
advisory fees from their clients due to their social
status and power, as centralized CEOs, directors
or board members are paid well and are less likely
to be fired due to their prestige, status and social
influence (Wong, Gygax and Wang, 2015). Our
findings show a positive relationship between ad-
visory firms’ fees and the four centrality measures.
More central financial advisors not only iden-
tify value-enhancing target firms but also charge
higher advisory fees for their superior services.
Central financial advisors have a comparative
information advantage, better access to and con-
trol of resources, and the power to influence others’
decisions. Hence, their involvement in merger ac-
tivity would be relatively high. Empirical evidence
reveals that central financial advisors are involved
in higher takeover activity.
It is well established in the M&A literature that
bidder size has a significant impact on almost all
dimensions of merger decision, such as acquisition
activity and bidders’ announcement returns. El-
Khatib, Fogel and Jandik (2015) argue that more
central CEOs are more likely to manage large ac-
quirers, who could afford to pay higher fees.Hence,
we expect more central financial advisors to be
more involved with larger acquirers. Servaes and
Zenner (1996) argue that deals for which the target
is publicly listed are more complex, and a higher
advisory fee is more likely to be charged. Our find-
ings suggest that central advisors are more likely to
advise large acquirers, acquisitions of public target
firms and acquisitions involving relatively larger
targets. More detailed discussion and supportive
empirical analysis can be found in the Appendix.
For robustness reasons, we identify advisor
connections by employing an additional and al-
ternative approach. We follow Bajo et al. (2016) to
establish connections among advisors. Financial
advisors are considered affiliates of their peer
network if they have advised the same bidder in
the past. Overall results are robust and similar to
the first proxy.
A natural question is whether the centrality
measures capture financial advisor factors such as
reputation, past performance and prior relation-
ship, which have already been studied in the litera-
ture. We orthogonalize the centrality measures by
these three variables and re-run the analysis with
the orthogonal version of the centrality measures
(Nyborg and Ostberg, 2014). Even with this ap-
proach, our results remain consistent with what
has been presented in the analysis so far.
Conclusions
This paper builds on the growing literature of net-
work centrality in corporate finance. While El-
Khatib, Fogel and Jandik (2015) examine the role
of CEO centrality in an M&A framework, and
Bajo et al. (2016) investigate the impact of under-
writers’ centrality in IPOs, this paper extends this
area of the literature by providing evidence of the
impact of financial advisors’ centrality on M&As.
We highlight the impact of financial advisors’ cen-
trality in merger outcomes, advisors’ fees and bid-
der and deal characteristics. One of the main as-
sets of financial advisors is their connections and
the information flow generated from their connec-
tions. Financial advisors are information interme-
diaries, with an information extraction and infor-
mation dissemination role. The more central the
advisor is in the network, the greater their ability
to access information.
Four centrality dimensions, that is degree, close-
ness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality, are
employed to capture financial advisors’ centrality
in their peer network for US advisors involved in
merger deals over the period 2000–2012. We find
that central financial advisors both create value
for their clients and the combined firm and charge
higher advisory fees for their superior services.
Central advisors also reduce information asymme-
try between bidders and targets, leading to lower
premiums paid by bidding firms. Leading advisors
seem to exploit their connections and their posi-
tion in their network to access and advise ‘fee-
generating’ deals. Our findings also indicate that
central financial advisors are more likely to be in-
volved in takeover deals initiated by a large ac-
quirer. We further show that central financial ad-
visors are more likely to be involved in deals of
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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public target firms and deals of relatively larger
target firms. These findings further reinforce the
argument that central advisors are more likely to
choose deals that are more likely to boost their
revenue.
This paper extends the literature that examines
financial advisors’ characteristics, such as advisors’
performance (Sibilkov and McConnell, 2014),
scope (Song, Wei and Zhou, 2013) and reputation
(Rau, 2000), and the prior relation of bidders with
their advisory banks (Francis, Hasan and Sun,
2014), on takeover deals. This paper introduces fi-
nancial advisor centrality as an additional key de-
terminant, which significantly affects the choice of
financial advisors during the acquisition process.
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